From Chomsky's The New York Review of Books, December 30, 1971 review, "The Case Against B. F. Skinner." webpage 
We'll try quoting the lead sentence of every paragraph and see where that leads. Forever hope.
quotes
A century ago, a voice of British liberalism described the "Chinaman" as "an inferior race of malleable orientals.
Consider now a generalized version of the pseudo-science of the nineteenth century: it is not merely the heathen Chinese who are malleable by nature, but rather all people.
Again, we may inquire into the exact meaning and scientific status of the claim, and the social functions it serves.
In his speculations on human behavior, which are to be clearly distinguished from his experimental investigations of conditioning behavior, B. F. Skinner offers a particular version of the theory of human malleability.
A close analysis shows that the appearance is misleading.
As to its social implications, Skinner's science of human behavior, being quite vacuous, is as congenial to the libertarian as to the fascist.
In view of the prestige of science and the tendencies toward centralized authoritarian control which can easily be detected in modern industrial society, it is important to investigate seriously the claim that the science of behavior and a related technology provide the rationale and the means for control of behavior.
Skinner assures us repeatedly that his science of behavior is advancing mightily and that there exists an effective technology of control.
It is a fact, Skinner maintains, that "behavior is shaped and maintained by its consequences" and that as the consequences contingent on behavior are investigated, more and more "they are taking over the explanatory functions previously assigned to personalities, states of mind, feelings, traits of character, purposes, and intentions"
As a science of behavior adopts the strategy of physics and biology, the autonomous agent to which behavior has traditionally been attributed is replaced by the environment -- the environment in which the species evolved and in which the behavior of the individual is shaped and maintained.
A "behavioral analysis" is thus replacing the "traditional appeal to states of mind, feelings, and other aspects of the autonomous man," and "is in fact much further advanced than its critics usually realize".
Not only has all of this been demonstrated, according to Skinner, but as the science of behavior progresses, it will, inevitably, more fully establish these facts.
These claims fall into two categories.
Claims of the first sort must be evaluated according to the evidence presented for them.
But perhaps Skinner is suggesting merely that the term "scientific understanding" be restricted to the prediction of behavior from environmental conditions.
The dogmatic element in Skinner's thinking is further revealed when he states that "the task of a scientific analysis is to explain how the behavior of a person as a physical system is related to the conditions under which the human species evolved and the conditions under which the individual lives".
In support of his belief that science will demonstrate that behavior is entirely a function of antecedent events, Skinner notes that physics advanced only when it "stopped personifying things" and attributing to them "wills, impulses, feelings, purposes," and so on.
Similarly, Skinner is correct in asserting that "modern physics or most of biology" does not discuss such matters as "a crisis of belief" or "loss of confidence".
This is true enough, if indeed there are no mediating states that can be characterized by an abstract theory of mind, and if personalities, etc., are no more real than the jubilance of a falling body.
It is hardly possible to argue that science has advanced only by repudiating hypotheses concerning "internal states."
This is a strange way of describing the matter.
We cannot specify, a priori, what postulates and hypotheses are legitimate.
It is important to bear in mind that Skinner's strictures do not define the practice of behavioral science.
Let us consider more carefully what Skinner means when he asserts that all behavior is externally controlled and that behavior is a function of genetic and environmental conditions.
No one would doubt that the likelihood of my going to the beach depends on the temperature, or that the likelihood of my producing a sentence of English rather than Chinese is "determined" by my past experience, or that the likelihood of my producing a sentence of a human language rather than of some imaginable but humanly inaccessible system is "determined" by my genetic constitution.
Consider, for example, the notion, "likelihood of my producing a sentence of English rather than Chinese."
But what does it mean to say that some sentence of English that I have never heard or produced belongs to my "repertoire," but not any sentence of Chinese (so that the former has a higher "probability")?
Skinner's response to criticism about such matters is illuminating.
Skinner does not comprehend the basic criticism: when his formulations are interpreted literally, they are clearly false, and when these assertions are interpreted in his characteristic vague and metaphorical way, they are merely a poor substitute for ordinary usage.
It is for this reason that Skinner assures the reader that he has no "need to know the details of a scientific analysis of behavior", none of which is presented.
If a physical scientist were to assure us that we need not concern ourselves over the world's sources of energy because he has demonstrated in his laboratory that windmills will surely suffice for all future human needs, he would be expected to produce some evidence, or other scientists would expose this pernicious nonsense.
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And this is just the end of part I. This is why people like twitter. Can someone summarize this review in ten simple paragraphs.
I sleep on this. I read just these sentences over in the morning. I fit them into a framework of what I already understood about both men. I think now I can successfully read part I through. This the Burden on the Slow Reader.